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The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of Right Restorations,
and Annual Accounting: A Cure
for the Inconsistencies
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code is premised on an annual accounting
concept which requires the taxpayer to count up his transactions at
the end of the year and remit to the Government taxes based on the
occurrences of that particular year. In theory this requires disregard-
ing the factors of prior or subsequent taxable years, despite their
relation to events of the tax year in question. In most instances,
annual accounting poses no special problem. When applied to certain
items whose tax impact transcends more than a single taxable year,
however, inconsistencies and inequities may result. Two instances
in which inconsistent tax treatment is occasioned by annual account-
ing are: (1) the restoration to another of items previously included
in the taxpayer's gross income because he had held them under a
claim of right; and (2) the recovery of items by the taxpayer which
he had deducted from his income in a prior tax year. To require
annual accounting with respect to these items makes the timing of
the restoration or recovery determinative of the tax consequences.
Variable factors such as fluctuation in the taxpayer's income and
changes in tax rates determine whether the taxpayer ultimately
pays more or less tax than if the original tax accounting were not
erroneous in light of subsequent events. For example, if recovery
of a previously deducted item occurs in a high income year for the
taxpayer, the progressive rate structure is likely to exact a higher
toll than if the taxpayer had foregone the original deduction so
that the later recovery would be a return of capital, and therefore not
taxable. It is the thesis of this note that the inconsistency is unneces-
sary and that the timing of a recovery or restoration need not deter-
mine the tax consequences. It is submitted that a transactional
approach that would provide tax accounting for an item in light of
events of prior years, as well as consideration of facts of the year of
restoration or recovery, should be used.
Such an approach is not unprecedented. Section 1341 of the 1954
Code follows it substantially in regard to restoration of items held
under a claim of right, and the Tax Benefit Rule views transactions as
a whole when a previously deducted item which did not offset taxable
income is recovered. But section 1341 stops short of the exact tax
accounting which a purely transactional approach would provide, and
the Tax Benefit Rule is inapplicable to recoveries of items if the prior
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deduction was tax beneficial. This note proposes the adoption of a
completely transactional approach under section 1341, and extension
of the theory of the Tax Benefit Rule to encompass the recovery of
deducted items which provided a tax benefit. Although this approach
is inconsistent with the annual accounting concept, it does not go
far beyond the departures already inherent in section 1341 and the
Tax Benefit Rule, and it would eliminate inconsistencies and inequities
under existing law.
II. THE PROBLEM: ANNUAL ACCOUNTING FOR
TRANsACTIONAL ITEMS
Congress recognized at an early date that the revenue needs of the
nation demanded that some period of time be established for computa-
tion of income forming the basis of tax liability.' This accounting
period principle was embodied in the first income tax under the six-
teenth amendment and has been adhered to in all subsequent income
tax enactments.2 Interpreting these statutory provisions, courts have
acknowledged the necessity for a regular accounting period. Thus in
the leading case of Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co. the Supreme Court
observed:
It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue
ascertainable, and payable to the government, at regular intervals.
3
In Healy v. Commissioner, the Court explained:
Congress has enacted an annual accounting system under which income is
counted up at the end of each year. It would be disruptive of an orderly
collection of the revenue to rule that the accounting must be done over
again to reflect events occurring after the year for which the accounting
is made.
4
The problem with the annual accounting concept is that it often
provides inconsistent tax accounting for items which have tax conse-
quences in two or more tax years. For example, an item deducted
as a bad debt in one year may be repaid in a later tax year. Assume
that the applicable tax rate in the year of deduction is 25 percent,
and is 50 percent in the year of recovery. Under current authority,
if there was sufficient taxable income to allow deduction of the full
amount of the debt, the recovery would be taxed in the year of
recovery at the 50 percent rate, although the deduction offset income
1. See 36 Stat. 112 (1909), where Congress imposed a corporate business privilege
tax measured by annual net income.
2. Rev. Act of 1913, § II(A) & (G)(c), 38 Stat. 166, 174 (1913); see Lassen,
The Tax Benefit Rule and Related Problems, 20 TAx MAG. 473, 474 (1942).
3. 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931) (emphasis added).
4. 345 U.S. 278, 284-85 (1953).
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taxable at only 25 percent.' If the taxpayer had not taken the deduc-
tion in the earlier year, however, the later recovery would have been
a nontaxable return of capital,6 and the effective tax rate would re-
main only 25 percent; that is, by foregoing the deduction he would
pay tax at 25 percent on the income which the bad debt deduction
would have offset. Obviously, the timing of the deduction, if taken,
determines the tax consequence. This result would be avoided if the
transaction were viewed as a whole. However, when the annual
accounting concept is applied strictly to the type of problem posed
in the foregoing example, "each taxable year must be regarded as an
independent unit ....
There are four situations in which strict annual accounting can
make timing determinative of tax consequences:
1. The Dry Deduction Problem.-Suppose A wrote off a bad debt
of 2000 dollars in 1960, a year in which he incurred a net operating
loss of 3000 dollars, and he fortuitously recovered the debt in 1964.
As seen above, had A not written off the debt in 1960 the recovery
would not have been taxable. Yet because he took the 1960 deduc-
tion, he would be required to include the recovery in his gross income
for 1964,8 absent some doctrine to the contrary. In this situation,
however, the Tax Benefit Rule would prevent taxation of the later
recovery, 9 thereby eliminating timing as a tax determinative factor
to the extent that it guards against a dry deduction.
2. Change in Tax Rates.-Suppose a taxpayer contributed property
to charity in 1939 and 1940 on condition that his gift be used for edu-
cational or religious purposes and that he took charitable deductions
in those years against applicable tax rates of 18 and 24 percent. In
1957 the property could no longer be used for the specified purposes
and it was returned to him. The applicable tax rate for the year of
return was 52 percent. If the transaction were viewed as a whole,
the taxpayer would need only to remit the taxes saved by the 1939
and 1940 deductions to effect the status quo, since he did not have
the use of the property and thus received no economic benefit from
it in the intervening years. Restoration of the tax savings would ac-
count entirely for any benefit which he received from the transaction.
5. See Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967),
noted in 21 V.A.D. L. REV. 288 (1968).
6. See First Nat'l Bank, Fort Worth, P-H 1943 Tax Ct. Mem. para. 43,073;
J. P. Bass Publishing Co., 12 B.T.A. 728 (1928). See also Plumb, The Tax Benefit
Rule Today, 57 Hnv. L. Rav. 129, 131 n.11, 133 n.20 (1943).
7. Helvering v. State-Planters Bank & Trust Co., 130 F.2d 44, 46 (1942).
8. For a brief explanation of this result, see Note, The Tax Benefit Rule and the
Loss Carryover Provisions of the 1954 Code, 67 YAL E L.J. 1394, 1398 (1958).
9. See text accompanying notes 24-31 infra.
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Yet, if he received a tax benefit from the 1939 and 1940 deductions,
current authority requires inclusion of the later recovery at the 1957
rates.10 If the property given in each of the two earlier years was
worth 1,000 dollars, the timing of the return of the property, coupled
with the intervening rate change, would cause the taxpayer to suffer
a net tax loss of 620 dollars."
3. Fluctuation of Income Within a Constant Rate Structure.-As-
sume the facts as set out in example (2), except that the applicable
tax rate remained constant. Also, assume that the taxpayer recovered
only one of the 1000-dollar contributions in 1957, but that his in-
come in 1957 placed him in a higher tax bracket than in 1939 or
1940. Obviously, the recovery would be subject to taxation at a rate
higher than that used when his income was offset by the contribution
deduction. Again, timing of the return of the property and an inter-
vening change of circumstances result in an overall tax loss. 12
4. Deduction Taken Over Several Years Recovered in One.-Again
assume the facts as set out in example (2), except that the applicable
tax rate remained constant. Assuming also that the taxpayer's income
remained constant in the years concerned, it is likely that the recovery
of 2000 dollars in 1957 would place the taxpayer in a higher tax
bracket than when he took the two 1,000-dollar deductions. In effect,
this would subject the recovery to a higher tax rate. Timing of the
recovery would again determine the tax consequence of the transac-
tion.'3
It should be obvious that in the latter three situations in which
timing can determine tax consequences, the result could as easily be
detrimental to the Government. Tax rates could go down, the tax-
payer's recovery-year income could be less, or a large deduction in
one year might be recovered over several years, thereby taxing the
10. The facts posed in this hypothetical are taken from Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp.
v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The court held that recovery must
be taxed at the 1957 rates, although it meant an out-of-pocket tax loss to the tax-
payer as a result of his charitable contributions.
11. Under the facts posed, the 1939 gift would yield a $180 deduction and the
1940 gift would represent a $240 tax savings. Yet the tax on the recovery would be
$1040 (52% of $2000): Thus, the taxpayer would suffer a net loss of $620. In the
,Healy case, quoted at note 4 supra, the Supreme Court said the effect of its decision
would mean that "factors such as the tax rates in the years involved and the brackets
in which the income of the taxpayer falls will be controlling" of tax consequence.
345 U.S. at 284. See also Webster, The Claim of Right Doctrine: 1954 Version,
10 TA L. REv. 381 (1954).
12. See Plumb, supra note 6, at 176-77, noting this effect of fluctuation in tax-
payers income.
13. See Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270, 272 (Ct. Cl. 1958): "[i]nclusion
in one year of all the deductions taken in several years would probably put the tax-
payer in a higher tax bracket."
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recovery in a lower tax bracket than that used when the income was
offset by the single-year deduction.
III. TBE TAx BENEFIT RULE
A. Development of Tax Benefit Doctrine
1. Judicial and Administrative Origin.-The Tax Benefit Rule is a
rule of administrative and judicial origin which was developed to deal
with the dry deduction problem discussed above.14 Its development
was preceded by judicial concurrence in the Bureau of Internal Reve-
nue's position15 that the recovery within a taxable year of an item
previously deducted should be accounted for as gross income:
[It] would be inequitable for the taxpayer to reduce his taxes for prior years
on account of the [deductions], and not to pay taxes on them when he got
them back. This . . . is a rule enunciated by the courts, and not by Con-
gress, and is based altogether on equitable considerations.16
Even if the taxpayer did not "reduce his taxes for prior years" by the
deduction, the early Bureau position was that the recovery was none-
theless taxable.' 7 Recognizing the inequity of this position, the Bureau,
14. Plumb, supra note 6, at 131.
15. The Bureau early ruled that if a bad debt were charged off and allowable as a
deduction, a subsequent recovery was taxable even if no deduction had been claimed.
S.R. 2940, IV-1 Cum. BULL. 129 (1925). The Board of Tax Appeals sustained this
ruling, at least where the bad debt had been claimed as a deduction. Lake View
Trust and Say. Bank, 27 B.T.A. 290 (1932). See Plumb, supra note 6, at 131-32.
16. Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270, 271 (Ct. Cl. 1958), noted in 8 Duxu
L.J. 151 (1959). Attempts by the Commissioner to invoke the tax benefit doctrine in
situations not falling strictly within the tax beneficial deduction-later recovery mold
have been of little avail. See, e.g., B. D. Anders, 48 T.C. 815 (1967), where taxpayer
had fully depreciated various corporate assets which were later sold and the proceeds
distributed to stockholders in a 12-month liquidation under § 337. The Commissioner
argued that since the assets had been deducted for the full tax benefit, the recovery
by sale was income to the taxpayer. The Tax Court, however, noted that what was
involved was a sale of assets which qualified under § 337. The fact that their cost
had already been deducted in full was not considered a barrier to nonrecognition of
gain under § 337. The tax tribunal said that Rev. Rul. 61-214, 1961-2 Cur. BUr.a.
60, which reached an opposite conclusion on similar facts, was not a valid interpretation
of the statute.
In Henry C. Beck Builders, Inc., 41 T.C. 616 (1964), affiliated corporations had
eliminated intercompany profits from a consolidated return filed for 1953. On termi-
nation of affiliation in 1957, the Commissioner asserted a deficiency based on failure
of the parent corporation to include the 1953 profit from the intercompany transac-
tions with its now-departed subsidiary. The Commissioner relied on his authority to
compel a change of accounting methods under § 446(b) if the taxpayer's method
does not properly reflect income, but his argument was analagous to that advanced
where the taxpayer recovers a beneficially deducted item;- i.e., that the 1953 non-
inclusion was equivalent to a deduction recovered upon the 1957 termination of
affiliation. The court rejected the argument and-said that § 481(a) prohibited a
change in accounting method by the. Commissioner since taxpayer "initiated" no
change. Id. at 623.
17. Note 15 supra.
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in a series of rulings by the General Counsel, indicated it would dis-
regard the later recovery if the prior deduction had not led to tax
savings.' 8 Although the Bureau later revoked these favorable rulings,19
the fundamental principles of the Tax Benefit Rule were established.
The Board of Tax Appeals, notably, continued to apply the Rule after
Bureau revocation.20 Several federal courts, however, followed the
Bureau position in taxing recoveries, regardless of prior tax benefit.21
2. Statutory Enactment and Dobson Extension.-Congress stepped
into the confusion in 1942 and statutorily applied the Tax Benefit Rule
to recoveries of bad debts, prior taxes and delinquency amounts.22 It
is not entirely clear why Congress limited the legislation to the enu-
merated situations, since witnesses at congressional hearings had urged
broader terminology.P In any event, Dobson v. Commissioner fore-
closed this question in 1943 when the Supreme Court applied the
Tax Benefit Rule to a recovery under a Blue Sky statute. 4 The Court
said the new code section was intended only to correct errors com-
mitted by the federal courts which refused to apply the Tax Benefit
Rule, and that it did not intend to precipitate further errors by narrow
construction of the legislation. Instead, the Court spoke in broad
terms:
The question of whether a recovery is properly accounted for as income in
the year received or should be related to a previous reported deduction
without tax benefit is one with a long history and much conflict. It arises
not only in case of recoveries ...of the type we have here [loss on sale
of stock later recovered under Blue Sky law]. It is also present in case
of refund of taxes or cancellation of expenses or interest previously re-
18. G.C.M. 18525, 1937-1 Cum. BuLL. 80, applied to banks and other corporations
subject to federal supervision. The memorandum stated, "the deductions for bad debts
contemplated by the clause 'allowed as a deduction for income tax purposes' . . .
refer to deductions for bad debts which accomplished a reduction in tax liability and
do not refer to deductions for bad debts in cases in which the taxpayer, on account of
other allowable deductions, had no net income irrespective of the deductions for bad
debts." Id. at 83. G.C.M. 20854, 1939-1 Ctnm. BULL. 102 extended the tax benefit
principle to cover debts voluntarily deducted by banks or other corporations subject
to state or federal supervision, and to recoveries of debts deducted by other taxpayers.
19. G.C.M. 22163, 1940-2 Gum. BuLL. 76.
20. See, e.g., Motor Prods. Corp., 47 B.T.A. 983 (1942); Citizens State Bank, 46
B.T.A. 964 (1942).
21. The Second Circuit said, "There is nothing in the regulation or in any statute
which makes the inclusion in gross income of collections on bad debts, previously
charged off as worthless, dependent upon whether or not the charge off has resulted
in a tax benefit to the taxpayer." Helvering v. State-Planters Bank & Trust Co., 130
F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1942).
22. INT. Rxv. CODE of 1939, § 22(b)(12) (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 111).
23. E.g., Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means on Revenue Revision
of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 88 (1942) [hereinafter cited as 1942 House Hear-
ings].
24. 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
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ported as accrued, adjustments of depreciation and depletion or amortiza-
tion, and other similar situations.2 5
The Treasury Regulations were quickly amended to reflect the
Dobson decision. The Tax Benefit Rule was declared to cover "all
other losses, expenditures, and accruals," as well as bad debts, prior
taxes and delinquency amounts.26
3.. Current Broad Application.-Subsequent decisions indicate the
broad application of the tax benefit doctrine as extended by Dobson.
The Court of Claims has held the rule applicable to charitable contri-
butions returned to the grantor because conditions of the gifts were
no longer possible to fulfill.27 The Internal Revenue Service has ruled
that where bondholders surrendered claims for past due interest
which had previously been deducted by the issuing corporation, there
was no increase in the corporation's income if the earlier deduction
resulted in no tax benefit.28 In Tuttle v. United States, 9 the Court of
Claims applied the doctrine to repayments to bank stockholders of
assessments on their bank stock. The court held that the repayments
could be recovered tax-free to the extent prior deductions reflecting
worthless stock had not been of tax benefit. The rule has even been
applied to income resulting from cancellation of indebtedness. In
Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp.,30 the taxpayer incurred a debt in a
loss year for which he took a non-beneficial deduction. The debt was
cancelled in a profit year and the Eighth Circuit held the cancellation
not to be income, because the indebtedness was incurred in a year in
which deduction was of no tax benefit.3 '
The current tax treatment, then, of an item deducted in one year
but subsequently recovered in another is determined by section 111
of the Internal Revenue Code if the item is a bad debt, a prior tax, or
a delinquency amount, and by judicial decision and administrative
ruling if some other item. Generally, the recovery will be taxed only
25. Id. at 506 n.36.
26. T.D. 5454, 1945 Cum. BuxrL. 68.
27. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967);
Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
28. Rev. Rul. 58-546, 1958-2 Crm. BuLL. 143.
29. 101 F. Supp. 532 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
30. 109 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1940).
31. See also Quincy Mining Co. v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 913 (Ct. Cl. 1957),
where the taxpayer took a deduction in 1920, a loss year, for costs of used copper
ore thrown away. In 1943, the value of the ore was recovered via a new process
and the taxpayer was permitted to apportion the 1920 costs to the recovered ore.
In Birmingham Terminal Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1011 (1951), a railroad in-
curred retirement losses with regard to its terminal facilities, but deduction of the
losses produced no tax savings. Later recovery of a portion of the losses, when the




to the extent of prior tax benefit. The Internal Revenue Code ex-
presses this in terms of a "recovery exclusion"-that portion of section
111 items initially deducted without affecting tax liability, determined
by taking away from the total sum of section 111 items in the original
year the amount of those items which reduced taxes.
3
B. Tax Benefit Theory
1. Legislative Expression.-Unfortunately, the legislative history of
Section 111 is not particularly enlightening. The section was originally
enacted during World War II when the overriding congressional con-
cern was financing the war effort m and therefore, little attention was
given in committee reports to the inclusion of the Tax Benefit Rule
in the legislation. The House Ways and Means Committee, in recom-
mending adoption of the Rule, said only:
The bill makes substantial changes in the treatment of bad debts. These
changes are designed to remove existing inequities....
There is at present considerable confusion as to the state of the law re-
garding the recovery of bad debts or taxes which have been taken as deduc-
tions in previous years. The confusion has arisen as to whether the taxation
of the amount of the bad debt or tax recovered in the year of such recovery
depends upon the tax benefit which the taxpayer derived from the deduc-
tion of these items in a prior year.
The bill settled this question by excluding from the gross income of the
taxpayer in the year of recovery the amounts recovered to the extent that
the debt or tax did not in any prior taxable year reduce his income tax
liability. Securities which become worthless and which result in a capital
loss are allowed the same treatment as bad debts and taxes.34
The most extensive statement in committee hearings on the Revenue
Act of 1942 in regard to enactment of the Tax Benefit Rule came
from Mr. Randolph Paul, tax advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury,
who emphasized the equitable nature of the tax benefit doctrine and
said it would eliminate hardship in many cases.35
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(b)(2) (1956).
33. 1942 House Hearings 1-3. The Revenue Act of 1942 was designed to raise
American tax revenue by 6 billion dollars. Id. at 2.
34. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 44, 45 (1942).
35. Mr. Paul noted that the Secretary of the Treasury had "pointed out that wartime
rates make it imperative to eliminate as far as possible existing inequities which
distort the tax burden of certain taxpayers." Listed among existing inequities was
the following example: "If a taxpayer who has taken a bad debt deduction later
receives payment of such debt, such payment must be included in his income even
though he obtained no tax benefit from the deduction in the prior year. While this
result is theoretically proper under our annual system of taxation, it may produce
severe hardship in certain cases through a distortion of the taxpayer's real income. At
the same time, any departure from our annual system of taxation always produces
administrative difficulties which serve to impede the collection of taxes. It is believed
that the hardships can be removed and the administrative difficulties kept to a minimum
by excluding from income amounts received in payment of the debt to the extent that
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Although there are few legislative materials regarding the original
enactment of section 111, the subsequent congressional adoption of
the tax benefit principles for basis adjustment clearly demonstrates
the equitable purpose of the tax benefit doctrine. The Revenue Act
of 1932 had explicitly required basis to be adjusted downward to the
extent basis deductions had been allowed, although in excess of the
deduction properly "allowable." 7 Previous revenue acts had referred
only to the latter amount as a reduction of basis. 38 The purpose of
the change in terminology was to ensure that taxpayers who were
allowed excessive basis reductions did not receive a double deduction
on later disposition of the property involved, that is, if deductions
in excess of the amount properly allowable were taken, and did not
reduce basis, the taxpayer would retain a correspondingly higher basis
for his property, although he benefited from the excessive basis re-
duction. The question arose whether basis should be reduced in the
amount of excessive deductions claimed though not properly allow-
able, if the reductions resulted in no tax benefit to the taxpayer. Al-
though presented in a different context, the question was essentially
the same as that encountered when a taxpayer recovered an item
previously deducted without tax benefit. Since the express congres-
the deduction on account of the debt in the prior year did not produce a tax benefit."
1942 House Hearings 87-88.
36. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1016(a) (2), formerly INT. Rzv. CODE of 1939, §
113(b) (1) (B).
37. Rev. Act of 1932, § 113(b)(1)(B): "Proper adjustment in respect of the
property shall in all cases be made . . . in respect of any period since February 28,
1913, for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence, amortization, and depletion, to the
extent allowed .... "
38. See, e.g., Rev. Act of 1928, § 111(b) (2); Rev. Act of 1926, § 202(b)(2): "The
basis shall be diminished by the amount of the deductions for exhaustion, wear and tear,
obsolescence, amortization, and depletion which have since the acquisition of the
property been allowable in respect of such property . ... "
39. The House Ways and Means Committee said: "The Treasury Department has
frequently encountered cases where a taxpayer, who has taken and been allowed
depreciation deductions at a certain rate consistently over a period of years, later finds
it to his advantage to claim that the allowances so made to him were excessive and that
the amounts which were in fact 'allowable' were much less. By this time the Govern-
ment may be barred from collecting the additional taxes which would be due for the
prior years upon the strength of the taxpayer's present contentions . . . the Treasury
should not be penalized for having approved the taxpayer's deductions. While the
committee does not regard the existing law as countenancing any such inequitable re-
sults, it believes the new bill should specifically preclude any such possibility." The
language of the section was accordingly changed from "allowable" to "allowed." H.R.
REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1932). Commenting on the 1932 amendment,
the Senate Finance Committee said, "The purpose of the amendment was to provide
that, where taxes had been reduced by excessive depreciation erroneously claimed and
the statute of limitations had barred the collection of the correct tax, the taxpayer could
not then claim that he could restore to basis the amount of the excess depreciation. If
this latter result had been permitted, the taxpayer in effect would have been allowed
a double deduction." S. REP. No. 1160, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952).
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sional purpose in the 1932 enactment was to prevent double deduc-
tions,40 it would seem that the tax benefit theory would have applied
to allow the taxpayer's disclaimer of the excessive adjustment previ-
ously allowed. The excessive deduction was of no tax benefit to him
and thus later disposition with a higher basis would not result in a
double deduction. This was the view of the Third Circuit in Pitts-
burgh Brewing Co. v. Commissioner.4' But the Supreme Court, in
Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering,42 took the contrary view and re-
quired the taxpayer to reduce his basis by the amount allowed in
excess of the amount allowable.
Chief Justice Stone, in dissent,43 viewed the result as "incongruous"
and contrary to the statute. Congress agreed and enacted what is
now section 1016(a)(2).44 In its report, the Senate Finance Committee
said, "this legislation is intended to correct the inequitable tax effects
* . .from the application of the rule of the Virginian Hotel case. 45
The report also stated that the taxpayer should not
be penalized because of his error in claiming excessive depreciation in an
earlier year, even though for that year he had a net loss ... even without
the deduction of the excessive depreciation. Under those conditions the
excess depreciation claimed by the taxpayer could have resulted in no tax
advantage to him and in no tax prejudice to the Government.46
Thus, the statutory enactments of the Tax Benefit Rule, sections
111 and 1016(a) (2), were intended by Congress to reverse erroneous
40. Note 39 supra.
41. 107 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1939). The court held that basis was not to be reduced
by an amount greater than the amount allowable if any claimed excess over that amount
was not tax beneficial.
42. 319 U.S. 523 (1943). In this case the taxpayer had taken depreciation deduc-
tions for the years 1927 to 1937 on hotel furnishings and fixtures, although the years
1931 to 1936 were net loss years. In 1938, the Commissioner disagreed with taxpayer's
claimed depreciation, asserting a longer useful life for some assets and reducing the
depreciation rates accordingly. The taxpayer did not contest the lower rates but con-
tested the Commissioner's basis determination, which had taken account of the deprecia-
tion claimed by taxpayer during the net loss years. He argued that the 1931-36 deduc-
tions were of no tax benefit and thus should not be used to decrease basis. The Supreme
Court did not agree "with the contention that such a reduction [of basis) must be made
only to the extent that the deduction for depreciation has resulted in a tax benefit ....
'Allowed' connotes a grant. Under our federal tax system there is no machinery for
formal allowances of deductions from gross income. Deductions stand if the Commis-
sioner takes no steps to challenge them." Id. at 526-27.
43. 319 U.S. at 528 (dissenting opinion).
44. The section reads: "Proper adjustment in respect of the property shall in all
cases be made .. . for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence, amortization, and
depletion, to the extent of the amount. . . allowed as deductions in computing taxable
income under this subtitle or prior income tax laws, and (B) resulting (by reason of
the deductions so allowed) in a reduction for any taxable year of the taxpayer's
taxes . . ..
45. S. REP. No. 1160, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952).
46. Id.
court decisions. By implication, at least, judicial decisions could have
fully implemented these tax benefit principles without transgressing
the congressional prerogative.
2. Judicial Explanation.-The decision in Dobson v. Commissioner
also supports a view that the judiciary has wide discretion in applying
the tax benefit doctrine. The Supreme Court there indicated that the
Tax Benefit Rule involves a question of proper tax accounting. An-
swering the Government's contention that the enactment of legislation
covering only bad debts, prior taxes and delinquency amounts evi-
denced an intent to exclude other items from the Tax Benefit Rule, the
Court said:
[WInstead of affording a reason for overruling the Tax Court, the history
of the bad debt recovery question illustrates the mischief of overruling the
Tax Court in matters of tax accounting. Courts were persuaded to rule as
matter of law that bad debt recoveries constitute taxable income, regardless
of tax benefit from the charge-off. The Tax Court had first made a similar
holding, but had come to hold to the contrary. Substitution of the courts'
rule for that of the Tax Court led to such hardship and inequities that the
Treasury appealed to Congress to extend relief.47
The idea of equity and prevention of hardship, while not articulated
in the early judicial decisions applying the Tax Benefit Rule, clearly
underlay the opinions. In what may be the first case applying the
tax benefit principle, 48 a taxpayer received in the taxable year in ques-
tion an award under the Minerals Relief Act of 20,000 dollars. The
award was to compensate for a 38,700-dollar loss suffered when the
end of World War I rendered the taxpayer's chrome plant obso-
lete. He had received 5,500 dollars for the plant at salvage, so that
his total out-of-pocket loss was 13,200 dollars. In declining to tax
the Minerals Relief award in the year of receipt, the Board of Tax
Appeals said, "Under these facts, we do not see how partial reimburse-
ment for losses sustained can be construed to be income."49 Obviously,
it would have been inequitable to do so. Had the annual accounting
concept been strictly applied, however, the taxpayer would have been
liable for tax on the full amount of the award: he would not have
been permitted to point to his losses in prior years to determine
taxability of an amount received during the current tax year.
Subsequent decisions by the Board of Tax Appeals often referred
to the Tax Benefit Rule as "well settled," and rarely explained the
basis of the doctrine.50 However, recent judicial opinions point ex-
47. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 505 (1943).
48. Edward E. Marshall, 10 B.T.A. 1140 (1928).
49. Id. at 1143.
50. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 40 B.T.A. 72, 75, aff'd, 115
F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1940): "It is now well settled . . . that if such amounts deducted
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plicitly to its equitable foundation. In Perry v. United States, the
Court of Claims said: "the so-called tax benefit rule . . . is a rule
enunciated by the courts, and not by Congress, and is based altogether
on equitable considerations."51 And in Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v.
United States, the court reiterated that "the tax-benefit concept is an
equitable doctrine....52
3. Administrative Rulings.-The administrative explanations of the
basis for the Tax Benefit Rule took a different tack. A 1939 General
Counsel Memorandum which fully discussed the concept53 stated that:
[i]n any case in which a bad debt has been allowed as a deduction and has
had the effect of offsetting income . .. the taxpayer has, to that extent, in
effect had the benefit of a recovery of capital for income tax purposes ....
To the extent that a deduction does not result in such a benefit to the tax-
payer, the deduction can not be said to have accomplished a return of
capital. Until the taxpayer has had the income tax equivalent of a full
return of the capital represented by his debt, there is no valid ground for
treating as income any amount received in recovery of the debt.54
It is submitted that this explanation of the rule is a resort to fiction:
recovery of a deducted item is not a return of capital, regardless of
whether the deduction produced a tax benefit. The true basis for
the ruling is the decision that a taxpayer need only make one tax
accounting for an item. When a non-beneficial deduction is taken
and the deducted item is subsequently recovered, inclusion of the
item in the later year in effect forces the taxpayer to account for the
item a second time. Thus, when the memorandum states "there is
no valid ground," it means there is no equitable ground, on which to
require the double tax accounting which results when a non-bene-
ficially deducted item is included in gross income upon subsequent
recovery.
The Bureau continued to ignore the equitable basis of the tax
benefit concept when it revoked the favorable 1939 ruling one year
later in General Counsel Memorandum 22163. Relying on the Treasury
[in a prior year] did not effect an offset of taxable income for the year in which
deducted, then recoveries in subsequent years should not be included in gross income
in the years of recovery." The court cited G.C.M. 1852.5 and 20854, discussed in
note 18 supra, and Central Loan & Investment Co., 39 B.T.A. 981 (1939), where the
court held a tax refund was not includable in gross income because the deduction at
time of payment had not been tax beneficial. Referring to the existence of the Tax
Benefit Rule, the court there said: "While the question of actual benefit may not
heretofore have been made a prerequisite to the inclusion in gross income of the amount
recovered, inferentially it has been a controlling factor." Id. at 984.
51. 160 F. Supp. 270, 271 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
52. 381 F.2d 399, 403 n.5 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
53. G.C.M. 20854, 1939-1 Cum. BEuL. 102.
54. Id. at 103-04.
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Regulations55 under section 22(b) (12) of the 1939 Code 6 and Burnet
v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,5 7 the Bureau concluded that "amounts
recovered in any taxable year upon debts previously charged off and
allowed as a deduction should be treated as taxable income regardless
of whether the prior allowance of the deduction resulted in a tax
benefit to the taxpayer."58
4. Conclusion.-The decision that bad debts may not be properly
considered capital investments does not compel the conclusion that
any later recovery on a deducted bad debt must be accounted for as
income whether or not the deduction was tax beneficial. The true
basis for exclusion when the deduction did not produce tax benefit is
that it would be inequitable to do otherwise. Congress premised its
adoption of the tax benefit concept on prevention of hardship and
apparently considered the question of taxability of recovery as one
of tax accounting.5 9 At no point did it indicate the excluded recoveries
represented a return of capital.
Both the judicially-created doctrine60 which taxes recovery of items
previously deducted and its exception-the Tax Benefit Rule-are based
on equitable considerations. Furthermore, the existence of the rule
does not depend upon its statutory embodiment in section 111; rather,
as the Supreme Court said in Dobson, the rule merely represents
proper tax accounting procedure,61 enacted into law by Congress to
prevent the hardship occasioned by courts which refused to accept
the tax benefit principle.62
C. Inconsistencies in Current Application
of the Tax Benefit Doctrine
Although the only justification for the Tax Benefit Rule is an at-
tempt to achieve equity, one commentator has observed that the rule
"is inherently incapable of producing exact justice."63 The commen-
tator might better have said that the Tax Benefit Rule as presently
applied is inherently incapable of producing exact justice. The cur-
rent application of the rule is inconsistent with its underlying bases.
55. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(k)-i, providing that amounts received on account of
bad debts previously allowed as deductions must be included in gross income in the
year in which received.
56. Now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 111.
57. 282 U.S. 359 (1931). The memorandum cited the case as establishing that
bad debt expenditures were not capital investments.
58. G.C.M. 22163, 1940-2 Cum. BuLL. 76, 79.
59. See text accompanying notes 34-35, 47 supra.
60. Text accompanying note 16 supra.
61. Text accompanying note 47 supra.
62. Text accompanying notes 34-35, 47 supra.
63. Plumb, supra note 6, at 176.
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A case in point is Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States. The
taxpayer in that case had taken deductions which had been fully
offset against income which would have been taxed at rates of 18
and 24 percent; his recovery of the deducted items came in a year
in which the applicable tax rate was 52 percent. The taxpayer argued
that "exact justice" required him to account only for the tax savings
which the prior deductions had provided and cited a previous case
in the same court, Perry v. United States,5 which ruled for the tax-
payer in an identical factual situation. The Government argued for
full taxation of the recovery at current rates and urged that Perry
be overruled. It viewed the Perry decision as out of line with other
judicial authority and "contrary to the statutory scheme."6 The Court
of Claims, although admitting the equity of the taxpayer's argument,
nevertheless overruled Perry. It said that "Perry achieved a result
which was more equitably just than legally correct,"67 and cited the
Sanford & Brook's emphasis on the integrity of the annual accounting
period as a basis for its decision:
To insure the vitality of the single-year concept, it is essential not only that
annual income be ascertained without reference to losses experienced in an
earlier accounting period, but also that income be taxed without reference
to earlier tax rates. And absent specific statutory authority sanctioning a
departure from this principle, it may only be said of Perry that it achieved
a result which was more equitably just than legally correct.6
In fact, however, the annual accounting concept does not demand
the Sullivan result: the later recovery of items previously deducted
is not technically income; rather, such items are taxed because it
would be inequitable to allow the taxpayer to take a deduction and
also retain the use of the subject-matter of the deduction by means
of the later recovery.69 This doctrine is judicially created and itself
departs from the annual accounting concept by referring to prior
years to determine whether amounts recovered had previously been
deducted.70 Furthermore, the Tax Benefit Rule as applied in Sullivan
64. 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The Sullivan facts were posed hypothetically in
Part H (2). See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
65. 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958), non acq., REv. RUL. 59-141, 1959-1 Cum.
BULL. 17.
66. Brief for Government at 10, Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381
F.2d 399 (Ct. C1. 1967). The Treasury Regulations indicate in passing that recoveries
of beneficially deducted items are to be taxed at recovery-year rates, although the point
is not discussed. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(b)(3) (1956).
67. 381 F.2d at 403.
68. Id.
69. Text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
70. Strict annual accounting would probably require the taxpayer to take a deduc-
tion every time he charged off a bad debt; otherwise a later recovery would auto-
matically be taxed as income since reference to the prior year to determine whether a
deduction had been taken would be precluded.
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requires reference to the prior year to determine whether the deduc-
tions were tax beneficial. It does no more violence to the annual ac-
counting concept to calculate tax savings attributable to prior deduc-
tions than it does to examine returns of earlier years to compute a
"recovery exclusion."
Sullivan clearly makes timing tax determinative. Had the contrib-
uted property been returned within a few years of the original trans-
actions, tax rates would likely have varied little; in the 18 years
which did elapse, however, tax rates shot up 34 percent. This inter-
vening rate change meant a sizable out-of-pocket tax loss for the tax-
payer-an inequitable result for having contributed the use of his
property to charity for 18 years. Indeed, the writer of the majority
opinion in Sullivan noted the injustice:
This opinion represents the views of the majority and complies with exist-
ing law and decisions. However, in the writer's personal opinion, it pro-
duces a harsh and inequitable result. Perhaps, it exemplifies a situation
'where the letter of the law killeth; the spirit giveth life.' The tax-benefit
concept is an equitable doctrine which should be carried to an equitable
conclusion. 71
While the inequity of Sullivan results from the intervening rise
in tax rates, other factors could have led to similar out-of-pocket
tax losses.72  For example, the taxpayer's deductions were taken
over two years, but recovery was bunched in one year, which could
easily have boosted the taxpayer into a higher tax bracket in the
recovery year. The taxpayer might also have substantially increased
his income since taking the deductions; under the progressive rate
structure the recovery would thus be taxed at a higher rate than the
income which the deductions offset. But it is not always the taxpayer
who suffers when timing is tax determinative. If a deduction taken
in one year is recovered over several years, or a deduction taken when
income was high is recovered in a low income year, or tax rates de-
clined between deduction and recovery, the Government would suffer
tax loss.7
3
71. 381 F.2d at 403 n.5.
72. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
73. The Government's brief in Sullivan noted the possibility of such a result: "The
Court's tax adjustment in the Perry case, though justified on the basis of equity, is not
necessarily any more equitable than inclusion of the recovery in income. The deduction
may have been taken during a period of higher taxes or when the taxpayer was in a
higher surtax bracket than at the time of recovery. In such an instance the effect of the
involuntary retroactive tax adjustment required by Perry would be to impose upon the
taxpayer who has not been at fault a higher tax in the later year than if the recovery
were in fact income." Brief for Government at 17, Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v.
United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The fallacy in the Government's "equita-
ble" argument is that when the transaction is viewed as a whole, the earlier, more
valuable deduction was not warranted. To properly reflect the transaction the taxpayer
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This uncertainty could be avoided by requiring the taxpayer to
account exactly for the amount of tax savings occasioned by his
prior deductions. In this way rates could change, income fluctuate,
and recovery or deduction be spread over any number of years
without increasing or decreasing the liability of the taxpayer. Such
a rule, said the writer of the majority opinion in Sullivan, "would
avoid a penalty to the taxpayer and an unjust enrichment to the gov-
ernment."74
IV. RESTORATION OF CLAIM OF RIGHT ITEMs
A. Introduction
Analagous to the problems presented when an item which has been
deducted is later recovered are those created when an item required
to be included in income under the so-called "claim of right doctrine"
must be restored in a later year. The question in both cases is
whether the tax consequences of the later event should be determined
by reference to the tax treatment of the item in the earlier year. Thus,
assume that A recovered a judgment against B for 2,000 dollars
in 1960 and was paid that amount. The claim of right doctrine would
require A to include the 2,000 dollars in his 1960 gross income75
If, however, the judgment were reversed on appeal in 1964 and A
required to return the 2,000 dollars to B, should he take a deduction
against his 1964 income on repayment, or should his 1960 tax liability
be adjusted to restore the additional taxes occasioned by the in-
clusion of the item in that year? Strict annual accounting requires
the former alternative. But, as demonstrated with problems involving
the Tax Benefit Rule,76 adherence to the annual accounting concept
could make timing tax determinative and increase the taxpayer's
liability.77 And, as noted earlier, the difference is as likely to work to
the detriment of the Government as to the taxpayer.78 Thus, while
the taxpayer faces an inclusion problem in the tax benefit situation
should remit the tax savings to which later events show he was not entitled. That is,
there is no reason why the taxpayer should be subject to a greater tax burden, as in
Sullivan, or receive a windfall, as in the hypothetical posed in the Government's brief,
when the later events show a prior deduction was unwarranted. The equitable solution
for the taxpayer and the Government is to adjust tax liability to reflect the transaction as
it actually occurred, not to segregate events in one year from those in another as if
they were unrelated.
74. 381 F.2d at 403 n.5.
75. North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
76. See text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
77. For example, if a taxpayer were in a 50% bracket during the year of receipt
and a 25% bracket at restoration, deduction in the latter year would in effect restore
only half the amount of taxes which subsequent events show the taxpayer did not owe.
78. Text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
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and a deduction problem upon restoration of a claim of right item, the'
basic question is the same-whether to apply strict annual accounting
and consider the later event on the basis of facts as they appear in
that year alone, or whether to view the later event in relation to facts
occuring in the earlier year which are directly connected to the later
event.
B. Development and Theory of Taxation for
Claim of Right Restorations
1. The North American Oil Decision.-At the outset, the initial
taxation of items held under a claim of right should be clearly distin-
guished from tax consequences attendant upon restoration of those
items. It is only the latter with which this paper deals. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court did not explicitly analyze the tax concepts in-
volved in regard to these two problem areas in the case which became
the leading authority on tax treatment of both. In North American
Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 9 the Supreme Court clearly spelled out
the claim of right doctrine, but it also added dicta regarding the
taxation of claim of right items which later had to be restored. The
case involved oil property in the hands of a receiver appointed to
hold the property pending litigation between the Government and
the owner. The receiver collected income from the property in 1916,
which was paid to the owner in 1917 when a judgment was rendered
in his favor. An appeal was taken which ultimately resulted in af-
firmance of the lower court decision for the owner. The problem in
North American Oil was to determine the proper year for inclusion
of the income in the owner's tax return. The Court held the receipt
in 1917 was under a claim of right and therefore required inclusion
for that year, but said further:
If in 1922 the Government had prevailed and the company had been obliged
to refund the profits received in 1917, it would have been entitled to a
deduction from the profits of 1922, not from those of any earlier year.80
Although this statement was dictum, it fathered a doctrine which some
commentators indicate ultimately directed the course of congressional'
legislation dealing with taxation of claim of right restorations.
8'
The Supreme Court was presented an opportunity to disavow, its
North American Oil dictum in United States v. Lewis.m There the
79. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
80. Id. at 424.
81. Casey & Craig, Restoration of Claim-of-Right Income and Percentage Depletio',
68 Dicmc. L. REv. 381, 384 (1964); Webster, The Claim of Right Doctrine: 1954
Version, 10 TAx L. REv. 381, 384 (1955).
82. 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
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taxpayer had received 22,000 dollars as a bonus in 1944, but due to
incorrect computation he was forced to restore 11,000 dollars to his
employer in 1946. After making the restoration, the taxpayer sued in
the Court of Claims for a refund of his 1944 tax attributable to the
restored sum. The Court of Claims allowed recovery, stating that:
We observe that the language [from North American Oil] relied on by the
Government was obiter .... [I]n the instant case ... the taxpayer, having
received the income, paid his tax, and did not ask the Government to wait
for its revenue until he had completed his litigation or resolved his question
otherwise ... the naked question [is] whether the Government should keep
the money paid to it upon the mistaken assumption that the citizen had
taxable income, when in truth he did not have the income, since he was
under a legal obligation to return the money to his employer.83
Nonetheless, on appeal the Supreme Court relied on the North
American Oil dictum, strictly applied the annual accounting concept,
and denied the taxpayer recovery of the taxes paid in 1944:
Income taxes must be paid on income received (or accrued) during an
annual accounting period . . . .The "claim of right' interpretation of the
tax laws has long been used to give finality to that period, and is now deeply
rooted in the federal tax system. . . .We see no reason why the Court
should depart from this well-settled interpretation merely because it results
in an advantage or disadvantage to a taxpayer.84
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented:
Many inequities are inherent in the income tax. We multiply them need-
lessly by nice distinctions which have no place in the practical administration
of the law. If the refund were allowed, the integrity of the taxable year
would not be violated. The tax would be paid when due; but the Govern-
ment would not be permitted to maintain the unconscionable position that
it can keep the tax after it is shown that payment was made on money which
was not income to the taxpayer.8 5
Congress took cognizance of the "inequities" occasioned by the
Lewis holding, and overturned it by enacting section 1341 into the
1954 Code.8 6 Committee reports recommending the legislation spe-
cifically repudiated the Lewis decision,87 and the House Ways and
Means Committee noted that "in many instances ...the deduction
2. Section 1341.-The statutory solution provided by section 1341 is
83. 91 F. Supp. 1017, 1020-22 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
84. 340 U.S. at 592. Subsequent to this decision the courts were nearly unanimous
in following this pronouncement to restrict the taxpayer's relief to deduction in the
repayment year. Casey & Craig, supra note 81, at 381.
85. 340 U.S. at 592.
86. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 1341.
87. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A294 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 451 (1954).
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allowable in the later year does not compensate the taxpayer ade-
quately for the tax paid in the earlier year."88
in the form of an election to the taxpayer: he may take a deduction
in the year he is forced to restore the item, or he may calculate the
tax attributable to inclusion of the item in the year he received it and
treat that figure as an overpayment of tax for the year of restoration,
whichever yields the greater tax savings.8 9
One writer asserts that section 1341's basic policy "is to adopt a
transactional approach for these situations under which in effect the
taxpayer foregoes his deduction for the year of repayment in return
for exclusion of the item from income."90 Yet, while the approach
is basically transactional, some commentators have correctly noted
that vestiges of the annual accounting concept remain.91 Thus,
when the taxpayer foregoes deduction in the repayment year and
seeks credit for the tax attributable to the restored item in the year
of receipt, the credit "is treated as a payment of tax on the last day
prescribed by law for payment for the taxable year and will be re-
funded or credited as an overpayment for that year."92 The effect is
to deny the taxpayer interest on the overpayment for the years inter-
vening between receipt and restoration. Were the congressional solu-
tion purely transactional, it would recognize the taxpayer's right to
interest on his monies, which the Government used between the re-
ceipt and repayment years. Section 1341, however, utilizes the annual
accounting concept in treating the restoration year as a unit by re-
garding the prior year's overpayment as overpayment in the later
year, although it does adopt a transactional approach in allowing
reference to the prior year to determine the amount of the over-
88. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A294 (1954).
89. INT. REv. CODE of 1954,. § 1341(a). The section is limited to restoration items
in excess of $3,000. In setting that limit, the House Ways and Means Committee said,
"The $3,000 limitation is imposed for administrative reasons. Moreover with smaller
amounts, excluding the repaid amount from the earlier year's income is likely to have
little, if any, tax advantage over taking a deduction in the year of restitution." H.R.
REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1954). Section 1341 does not apply in the
case of deduction allowable regarding certain items included in gross income because of
their sale or disposition as an inventory item, nor to certain refunds made by a
regulated public utility. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1341(b) (2). The former excep-
tion was made because of congressional feeling that such returns could be adequately
provided for by means of reserves for estimated expenses under section 462. H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A294 (1954).
90. S. SurxEY & W. WAmREN, FEDEnAL INCOME TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS
551 (1960).
91. Casey & Craig, supra note 81, at 387; Webster, supra note 81, at 384. Webster
maintains that when "the claim of right doctrine is used to justify and explain the
requirement that the correction of that income item on the basis of later developed
facts may not be made in the year of receipt, it is being conceptually confused with
the annual accounting concept ..... Id.
92. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A295 (1954).
1968 ] NOTES 1013
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
payment. In those situations where the taxpayer does not elect to
forego the deduction upon restoration,93 the approach is clearly not
transactional, but is in line with the annual accounting concept as
applied in Lewis.
C. Recommendation of Transactional Approach for
Claim of Right Restorations
Although the section 1341 election is always to the taxpayer's bene-
fit, adoption of a purely transactional approach is preferable. As
one writer declared, a "conceptually acceptable approach" would
not tolerate election.95 Nor is there any sound policy reason for pro-
viding a windfall to the chance taxpayer who finds that a deduction
in the restoration year will result in greater tax savings. Rather, to
achieve conceptual consistency and assure fairness among taxpayers,
the transaction should be viewed as a whole and the taxpayer required
to adjust his prior year's tax liability, thereby receiving as a refund
or credit only that amount which he actually overpaid. He should
not receive a windfall because tax rates or his own personal income
have risen between the years of receipt and restoration. Further-
more, as other writers have suggested,9 the taxpayer should be
awarded interest on the amount overpaid for the years during which
the Government had the use of his money. Thus, the overpayment
would not be treated fictitiously as an overpayment of tax for the year
of restoration, but would be acknowledged as an overpayment for
the year of receipt, the year in which the erroneous payment actually
occurred.
V. RECOMMENDATION OF TRANSACTIONAL ACCOUNTING
FOR TRANSACTIONAL ITEMs
A. Elimination of Inconsistencies of
Strict Annual Accounting
The transactional approach recommended for restoration of items
held under a claim of right is also the proper manner in which to
deal with the recovery of items which previously produced a tax
beneficial deduction 7 Although the Tax Benefit Rule adequately
93. IN r. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1341(a) (4).
94. The taxpayer must take a deduction in the restoration year or readjust his liability
in light of the prior year, depending on which alternative produces the lesser tax.
95. Webster, supra note 81, at 387.
96. See, e.g., Bierman & Helstein, Accounting for Prepaid Income and Estimated
Expenses Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 10 TAx L. REv. 83, 116 (1954);
Webster, supra note 81, at 400.
97. Other proponents of some form of a transactional approach include Casey &
Craig, supra note 81; Plumb, supra note 6, at 176-82; Surrey & Warren, The Income
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treats recoveries where a prior deduction resulted in no tax benefit,98
where the prior deduction was beneficial the later recovery is often
inconsistently treated to the detriment of the taxpayer or the Govern-
ment 9 The recommended transactional approach would allow tax
consequences to be measured by the actual economic effect of a
transaction and would eliminate timing as determinative of tax
consequences. Under the transactional approach it makes no dif-
ference when the taxpayer recovers an item previously deducted.
In all cases, he must repay the tax savings occasioned by the earlier
deduction to which later events show he was not entitled.
Not only would the transactional approach more accurately reflect
economic reality, but it also would better effect the underlying
equitable basis for the Tax Benefit Rule, a basis acknowledged by
both Congress'00 and the courts,'0' including the United States Su-
preme Court. 02 The transactional approach would carry, as Judge
Collins said in Sullivan, "an equitable doctrine . . . to an equitable
conclusion." 0 3 It would eliminate the criticism that the "tax benefit
doctrine.., is an erratic and arbitrary one, disregarding completely
the impact of changing tax rates and changing tax brackets."1 4
Moreover, the transactional approach would be more consonant
with the values of good tax law than is the current approach. It
would assure fairness among taxpayers by treating them uniformly,
whereas the annual accounting approach, except in rare cases, 05
results in either inequity or windfall to the taxpayer.106 The transac-
tional approach would pose no substantial problem in administration.
Under the Sullivan view prior tax returns must be examined, first, to
Tax Project of the American Law Institute: Gross Income, Deductions, Accounting,
Gains and Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66 Hazv. L. RvV. 761, 797-99 (1953);
Webster, supra note 81, at 401-02.
98. See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra, which demonstrates application of the
Tax Benefit Rule to eliminate the "dry deduction" problem.
99. Text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
100. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1942).
101. See, e.g., Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl.
1967); and Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270, 271 (Ct. Cl. 1958), discussed in
this regard at text accompanying notes 51 & 52 supra.
102. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 505 (1943).
103. 381 F.2d at 403 n.5.
104. Surrey & Warren, supra note 97, at 798.
105. Only where tax rates and taxpayer income remain constant and recovery occurs
over the same number of years and in the same amounts per year as the original
deductions will the transactional and strict annual accounting approaches produce
identical results.
106. If rates go down, or the taxpayer has less income in the year of recovery than
in the deduction year, or recovery is effected over more years than deduction, the
taxpayer will receive a windfall. If these factors are reversed, the taxpayer pays more
than he equitably owes. In either set of circumstances, timing of the recovery deter-
mines the tax consequence.
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see if there was a deduction in the earlier year and, second, to de-
termine the extent to which the deduction was tax beneficial. 107
Once the prior returns are involved, calculation of the tax attributable
to the deduction would be a relatively minor additional step.
Furthermore from the standpoint of revenue, neither alternative
is certain of higher productivity than the other. The result under
strict annual accounting depends on when the later recovery comes
and the effect of variables, such as change in tax rate and fluctuation
of taxpayer income in the years between deduction and recovery.
While the transactional approach could not assure more revenue, it
would assure a full return of tax monies due the Government. The
transactional approach achieves "exact justice by assuring that the
taxpayer restores the precise amount, in dollars of tax, by which he
profited from the deduction."':°
B. Judicial or Administrative Adoption
While adoption of a purely transactional approach in taxing restora-
tion of items held under a claim of right requires amendment of
section 1341, it is suggested that implementation of that approach for
tax benefit situations can be done by judicial or administrative
decision.
The Supreme Court in Dobson referred to questions in this area
as "matters of tax accounting."'0 If so, transactional accounting is
no less proper than the Sullivan method, since both involve es-
sentially the same mechanics."10 Furthermore, Congress impliedly
acknowledged this area to be one for judicial discretion when it
originally enacted section 111. The purpose of enactment was to
deter courts who refused to follow the approach taken by the Board
of Tax Appeals,"' which had applied the Tax Benefit Rule for at
least fourteen years prior to the enactment of section 111.112 Since
this legislation was designed solely to preserve a remedy of purely
judicial and administrative origin, it should be presumed that, in the
107. Text accompanying notes 69 & 70 supra.
108. Plumb, supra note 6, at 182.
109. 320 U.S. at 505.
110. The only difference is that transactional accounting examines a prior year to
determine the tax attributable to deductions in that year, whereas the Sullivan approach
turns to the prior year to see only if there were a deduction and if it were tax
beneficial. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
111. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1942); Dobson v. Com-
missioner, 320 U.S. 489, 505 (1943).
112. The first application of the tax benefit principle was apparently in Edward E.
Marshall, 10 B.T.A. 1140 (1928), discussed in text accompanying notes 48 & 49 supra.
Section 111 was originally enacted in 1942. Rev. Act of 1942, § 116, INT. REV. COD,
of 1939, § 22(b)(12).
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silence of Congress, the proper implementation of that remedy was
intended to be accomplished by the administrative body and courts
which formulated the rule.
Section 111 does not speak to the problem of recovery of tax
beneficial deductions; its concern is a "recovery exclusion" where prior
deduction was of no benefit." 3 It has been argued that, since Con-
gress enacted section 1346 (which takes a transactional approach re-
garding recovery of unconstitutional taxes) in the same year in which
it enacted section 111, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
requires a strict annual accounting approach; that is, the designation
of a transactional approach for recovery of unconstitutional taxes
implies strict annual accounting was intended for items not men-
tioned.1 4 Another maxim, however, says statutes in pail materia are
to be construed together. Since Congress was silent as to treatment
of recovery of items beneficially deducted in a prior year, if sections
111 and 1346 are read together, under this maxim it could be pre-
sumed that Congress intended that such recoveries be taxed similarly
to recoveries under section 1346. The point, however, is that Congress
did not deal with this problem in section 111. It is of little avail to
argue what the silence of Congress meant or means, especially since
the tax benefit doctrine is purely of judicial and administrative origin.
Its current application, except as to bad debts, prior taxes and delin-
quency amounts, is wholly dependent upon judicial decision and
administrative ruling." 5 A doctrine so independent of statute in origin
and current application surely is not dependent on statutory amend-
ment to achieve equitable implementation.
Nor does the annual accounting principle bar the transactional ap-
proach. As one writer expressed: "there is one reply [to the objection
of violation of annual accounting]: Congress, in enacting section
[111], departed from the principle of the annual system . . . in the
name of equity."" 6 Even the Supreme Court, which spoke of annual
accounting as an almost inviolable principle in Sanford & Brooks,
Lewis, and Healy,"7 recognized that the principle was not breached
when reference to a prior year was to determine tax incidence of a
related transaction in a later year. In Arrowsmith v. Commissioner,
the Court said:
113. Ir. REv. CODE of 1954, § 111.
114. Brief for Government at 17, Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381
F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
115. That the Tax Benefit Rule remains primarily one of judicial application, despite
section 111, see Note, The Tax Benefit Rule and the Loss Carryover Provisions of the
1954 Code, 67 YA.x L.J. 1394, 1415-17 (1958).
116. Plumb, supra note 6, at 178.
117. See text accompanying notes 3 & 4, 84 supra.
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this principle [of annual accounting] is not breached by considering all the
1937-1944 liquidation transaction events in order to properly classify the
nature of the 1944 loss for tax purposes. Such an examination is not an
attempt to reopen and readjust the 1937 to 1940 tax returns, an action that
would be inconsistent with the annual tax accounting principle." 8
Congress explicitly approved the Arrowsmith approach as to restora-
tion of claim of right items when it enacted section 1341.11 Further-
more, whereas annual accounting was at one time a rigid tenet of
federal income taxation, current exceptions to that principle are so
numerous that one may almost question whether the exceptions have
eaten up the rule. In the Internal Revenue Code alone there are at
least 58 deviations from annual accounting.120 Transactional account-
ing is not inconsistent with this statutory scheme, and, as discussed
above,' 2 ' does no more violence to annual accounting than current
judicial applications of the Tax Benefit Rule.
118. 344 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1952).
119. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 452 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A294 (1954).
120. Exceptions are contained in sections: 46(b) (carryback and carryforward of
investment tax credit); 47 (recapture of investment tax credit); 72(n) (2) (averaging
of certain distributions to self-employed); 72(m) (5) (spreading penalty applicable to
certain owner-employee pension plans); 80(b) (tax benefit rule regarding recovery of
certain securities); 111; 167 (depreciation); 168 (amortization of emergency facilities);
169 (amortization of grain-storage facilities); 171 (amortization of bond premium);
172 (net operating loss carryback and carryforward); 178 (amortization, depreciation
allowance to lessees); 179 (small business additional depreciation); 248 (amortization
of "organizational expenses"); 267 (disallowance of deduction between related tax-
payers); 332 (nonrecognition on subsidiary liquidation); 336 (nonrecognition on corpo-
rate liquidation); 337 (nonrecognition on 12-month liquidation); 401-05 (qualified
pension, profit-sharing plans); 421-25 (qualified stock options); 441(f) (election of
53-week taxable year); 443 (return for less than 12 months); 451 (long-term income
reporting methods); 453 (installment income reporting); 454 (election regarding dis-
count obligations); 455.56 (prepaid income); 472 (last-in, first-out inventories); 481
(change in accounting method); 482 (allocation of income and deductions among
taxpayers); 563 (extension of taxable year to determine dividends paid); 564 (carry-
over for dividends paid deduction); 663(b) (estate distribution); 666 (throwback
rules); 812 (insurance company operations loss carryback and carryforward); 825
(mutual insurance company unused loss deduction carryback and carryforward);
855 (regulated investment company dividend declaration); 858 (real estate investment
trust dividend declaration); 1016(a) (2); 1031-38 (common nonrecognition situations);
1201-02 (capital gain provisions); 1242 (net operating loss carryback and carryforward
for small business company stock); 1245, 1250 (depreciation recapture); 1247(a)(2)
(B) (extension of taxable year for foreign investment company to determine dividends
paid); 1301-05 (income averaging); 1311-15 (correction of errors of prior years);
1321 (involuntary liquidation of LIFO inventory); 1331-37 (tax benefit rule regarding
war loss recoveries); 1341; 1342 (recovery of item held by another under claim of
right); 1346 (recovery of unconstitutional federal taxes); 1351 (tax benefit rule re-
garding recovery of foreign expropriation losses); 1375(f) (extension of taxable year
to determine distributions of small business corporations); 1383 (co-op redemption
of nonqualified written notices or per-unit retain certificates); 1481-82 (mitigation of
effect of renegotiation of government contracts); 1501 (filing of consolidated return by
certain affliated corporations); 6851 (termination of taxable year in jeopardy situation).
121. Text accompanying notes 106 & 107 supra.
The statute of limitations' would not present a problem, because
there would be no assessment or collection of tax for the prior year,
but rather a determination of tax liability for the recovery in the
later year.m
C. Statutory Amendment
1. Tax Benefit Rule.-Although judicial or administrative imple-
mentation of the transactional approach is possible, decisions such
as Sullivan-where the court, though presented with a direct precedent
for the transactional approachm and recognizing the inequity of its
nontransactional result,'2 felt judicial implementation would have
been invalid-indicate a legislative solution may be necessary. The
American Law Institute's 1953 Income Tax Project recommended
an approach similar to that of section 1341.12 It provided an election
between inclusion of the recovery in income and reopening of the
prior year to account exactly for tax savings. It is submitted that a
more appropriate approach would be to require reopening of the prior
year. The election, as discussed in regard to claim of right restora-
tions,'27 is not "conceptually acceptable" and nearly always results
in an inexact tax accounting.
The taxpayer should be liable for interest on the amount of tax
savings from the earlier year, since he has had the use of the equiva-
lent of this amount, to which later events show he was not entitled.
128
While the statute of limitations would not have to be waived to
require accounting for the prior tax savings,'2 9 it is likely that a waiver
would be necessary in order to require payment of interest on the
amount found due. Precedent for such a waiver exists in the mitiga-
tion sections, 1311-1314.
122. INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 6501.
123. "The statute of limitations bars assessment or collection of an additional tax
for that year; but it has no bearing on the determination of a recovery exclusion in a
later year." Plumb, supra note 6, at 170-71. Accord, Lassen, supra note 2, at 475:
"The new element in the later taxable period is the decisive factor."
124. Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. C1. 1958).
125. 381 F.2d at 403 n.5.
126. See discussion of the ALI proposal by Surrey & Warren, supra note 97, at
797-99.
127. Text accompanying notes 94-96 supra.
128. Precedent for requirement of interest exists in § 1342, which applies when a
party takes a deduction because another is paid money or property by a court decision
in a patent infringement suit. If the decision is reversed, the person who took the
deduction because of the other's claim of right may elect between inclusion of the
recovery in income for the year of the reversal and accounting for the tax savings
occasioned by the prior deduction. If the latter alternative is chosen, the taxpayer is
required to pay interest on the tax savings for the years between deduction and
recovery. See S. REP. No. 1254, 1955 U.S. CODE, CONG. & ADmnr. NEws 3106.
129. See note 123 supra.
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The ALI Project recommended the transactional approach only if
the amount involved were significant.130 Apparently the limitation
to significant recoveries was in deference to administrative con-
venience.'31 If such a limitation is necessary, it is suggested that a
recovery should be considered significant only if in excess of 3,000
dollars. This would be consistent with the present limitation in sec-
tion 1341, and since under the present progressive rate structure, tax
brackets usually vary from 2,000 to 4,000 dollars, the taxpayer would
likely achieve little benefit from the transactional approach'32 when
amounts under 3,000 dollars are involved. Such a limitation would
still effectively guard against inequity due to fluctuation of taxpayer
income, and also eliminate any substantial inequity in the case of
deduction taken over several years but recovered in one year. While
it would not provide relief in the case where tax rates have changed
between deduction and recovery, rates have remained fairly con-
stant since 1954,13 and the impact of rate change on an item of less
than 3,000 dollars is likely to be slight.
2. Section 1341.-Consistent with the proposed legislative treatment
for tax benefit problems, section 1341 should be amended to eliminate
election and require Government refund of the tax attributable to
the restored claim of right item. As discussed above,'3 this amend-
ment should provide interest to the taxpayer for the years during
which the Government had use of the tax monies to which later events
show it was not entitled.
D. Characterization Problem
It should be observed that the approach recommended by this
paper resolves the characterization problem with which the Supreme
Court was faced in Arrowsmith v. Commissioner.'- There taxpayers
had liquidated a corporation and taken capital gain. A hidden li-
ability emerged several years later and the taxpayers were forced to
130. A recovery was deemed significant if in excess of $2000 or 20% of the taxpayer's
current net income. Surrey & Warren, supra note 97, at 798.
131. That was the reason advanced for a similar limitation in § 1341. See H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1954).
132. In addition to § 1341, the income averaging provision, §§ 1301-05 also condi-
tions application on a $3000 minimum amount. In selecting that figure, the House
Ways and Means Committee said, "with the progressive rate structure with tax brackets
usually of $2000 to $4000, smaller amounts achieve little, if any, benefit from averag-
ing." H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1963).
133. See Surrey & Warren, supra note 90, at 21. The Revenue Act of 1964, 78
Stat. 19 (1964), reduced rates somewhat, including a reduction in the overall maximum
rates applicable to individuals from 91% to 77%o.
134. Text accompanying notes 94-96 supra.
135. 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
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pay the obligation as transferees of the liquidated corporation's assets.
They attempted to deduct the payment against ordinary income, but
the Supreme Court, noting that had the liability been satisfied during
liquidation it would have offset income taxed as capital gain, required
the taxpayers to take a capital loss.
Here, then, was an instance where the taxpayer argued for strict
annual accounting, citing North American Oil and Lewis. But the
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the annual accounting
concept was violated by consideration of the prior tax history of a
particular item in order to determine tax treatment for the current
year, and as to characterization of restorations of claim of right items,
dictated a transactional approach.'3 This approach was explicitly
retained under section 1341: both the House Ways and Means and
Senate Finance Committees referred to their understanding that the
Arrowsmith principle was embodied in that section.'37
Theoretically, the characterization question remains open with re-
gard to the tax benefit situation. Assume, for example, a securities
dealer who took an ordinary loss for worthless stock in 1960, which
was restored to value in 1965 when he was no longer a dealer, but
was engaged in the grocery business. Since the stock represents a
capital asset in his hands, may he take a capital gain on the later
recovery, although the original deduction offset ordinary income?
136. A portion of the Arrowsmith opinion is quoted at note 118 supra. Strangely
enough, Mr. Justice Douglas, who dissented from the failure to take a transactional
approach in Lewis, dissented from adoption of the transactional approach here: "There
were no capital transactions in the year in which the losses were suffered. These
transactions occurred and were accounted for in earlier years in accord with the
established principle that each year is a separate unit for tax accounting purposes."
344 U.S. at 9 (dissenting opinion). However, he did explain the inconsistent positions
taken in his dissents: "I have not felt, as my dissent in the Lewis case indicates, that
the law made that [annual accounting] an inexorable principle. But if it is the law,
we should require observance of it." 344 U.S. at 9-10 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice
Jackson also dissented, noting that while the result here prevented a "windfall" to the
taxpayer, the Government's "victory may have implications in future cases which will
cost the Treasury more than a defeat." If there were undisclosed claims here instead
of liabilities, he said, "the logic of the Court's decision . .. if adhered to, would
result in a lesser return to the Government than if the recoveries were considered
ordinary income. Would it be so clear that this is a capital loss if the shoe were on
the other foot?" 344 U.S. at 11-12 (dissenting opinion).
137. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 452 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A294 (1954). The House Ways and Means Committee said, "this
section will apply to cases of transferee liability such as Arrowsmith v. Commissioner.
Thus while the deduction in the current year is capital in nature, the taxpayer is not
deprived of all relief because his tax is reduced at least to the extent of the tax
attributable to the prior inclusion." Id. The transactional approach as to characteriza-
tion was recently reaffirmed by the Internal Revenue Service. Taxpayer had a
$100,000 gain when his property was condemned by the state. In a later year, following
a court action, he had to repay $20,000. The IRS ruled the original transaction deter-
mined the character of the loss: since the gain had been capital, the loss was also
capital. Rev. Rul 67-331, P-H 1967 FaD. TAx SERv. ff 55,159.
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The question would never be reached under the approach advocated
by this note. Rather, the transaction would be viewed as a whole.
In light of the subsequent restoration to value of the stock, it is
apparent that the earlier loss deduction was unwarranted. Therefore,
the taxpayer would be required to account for the tax savings attribut-
able to that deduction. It would not be necessary to characterize the
recovery as capital or ordinary, although the tax savings for which
he is required to account was dependent on whether his loss deduc-
tion in the prior year was capital or ordinary.
VI. CONCLUsION
Federal income taxation is a complex field permeated by technical
rules and distinctions which are designed to raise revenue in as fair
a manner as possible without undue administrative inconvenience.
Circumstances often dictate that one of these values be sacrificed in
order that another be achieved. However, where no compelling
reason requires otherwise, the tax law should represent a fair compro-
mise between revenue needs, collection ease, and fairness among
taxpayers. The current taxation of transactional items does not rep-
resent such a compromise. In the name of the technical concept of
annual accounting, taxpayers who recover prior deductions or re-
store claim of right items bear an uneven tax burden. Whether they
are unduly favored or treated inequitably is determined by the timing
of their recovery or restoration and the intervention of variable fac-
tors, such as change in tax rates and fluctuation of personal income.
To provide uniform treatment for transactional items, this note rec-
ommends the adoption of transactional accounting, which disregards
the annual accounting concept to the extent of considering events
of prior tax years which are related to events in a later year in order
to determine tax liability for the later year. This approach would
not sacrifice revenue or administrative convenience. Rather, it would
assure exact tax accounting to the Government in all cases, and
would involve only a minor additional step in a tax determination
process which already requires reference to prior years for both claim
of right restorations and recoveries of previously deducted items.
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